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Summary 
In this paper, we propose the technological complexity of a product and the level of 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) protection to be the co-determinants of the mode 
through which multinational firms purchase their goods. We study the choice between intra-
firm trade and outsourcing given heterogeneity at the product- (complexity), firm- 
(productivity) and country- (IPRs) level. Our findings suggest that the above three 
dimensions of heterogeneity are crucial for complex goods, where firms face a trade-off 
between higher marginal costs in the case of trade with an affiliate and higher imitation risks 
i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  s o u r c i n g  f r o m  a n  i n d e p e n d ent supplier. We test these predictions by 
combining data from a French firm-level survey on the mode choice for each transaction 
with a newly developed complexity measure at the product-level. Our fractional logit 
estimations confirm the proposition that although firms are generally reluctant to source 
highly complex goods from outside the firm’s boundaries, they do so when a strong IPR 
regime in the host country guarantees the protection of their technology. 
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Abstract
In this paper, we propose the technological complexity of a product and the level of Intellectual
Property Rights (IPRs) protection to be the co-determinants of the mode through which multina-
tional ﬁrms purchase their goods. We study the choice between intra-ﬁrm trade and outsourcing
given heterogeneity at the product- (complexity), ﬁrm- (productivity) and country- (IPRs) level.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the above three dimensions of heterogeneity are crucial for complex
goods, where ﬁrms face a trade-oﬀ between higher marginal costs in the case of trade with an
aﬃliate and higher imitation risks in the case of sourcing from an independent supplier. We test
these predictions by combining data from a French ﬁrm-level survey on the mode choice for each
transaction with a newly developed complexity measure at the product-level. Our fractional logit
estimations conﬁrm the proposition that although ﬁrms are generally reluctant to source highly
complex goods from outside the ﬁrm’s boundaries, they do so when a strong IPR regime in the
host country guarantees the protection of their technology.
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tional logit estimation
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‘The intellectual property issue remains the most complicated thing we have to deal with,’ says
Pat Toole, general manager of I.B.M. Engineering and Technology Services. ‘If we can all ﬁgure
it out, farming out design will be a common model in the future. If we can’t, it won’t.’ (New
York Times, 30 December 2004). The appraisal matches the results of a survey conducted by the
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in the same year, in which 84% of all executives state that
they perceive the lack of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) protection in emerging markets as
a challenge when outsourcing their R&D. In stark contrast to the emphasis the business world
puts on IPR protection when outsourcing upper parts of the value chain, the issue has attracted
little attention in the economic literature. This paper tries to ﬁll this gap by analyzing how IPR
protection determines the mode through which ﬁrms source complex products. The topic naturally
connects two research strands.
First, it relates to a range of studies investigating the impact of IPRs on Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI)(see e.g. Glass and Saggi, 2002, Glass, 2004 and Branstetter et al., 2007 ).1 While the results
in these papers directly hinge on the capacity and the costs of imitation in a destination country,
Glass and Wu (2007) show how the phenomenon could also depend on the type of innovation.
More closely related to our argument, Nicholson (2002) studies the mode choice of international
sourcing and claims the fear of loosing a proprietary asset to be the main consideration when
deciding between FDI and licensing. At low levels of IPR protection, technologically sophisticated
ﬁrms tend to internalize. A more stringent IPR regime, however, mitigates the imitation risk
and may induce a shift towards licensing. As these models do not make a reference to product
heterogeneity, their propositions have been tested empirically using aggregate data.
Second, a series of inﬂuential papers shift the argument to the choice between purchasing from
an aﬃliate, or from an independent supplier, where the latter gives rise to a hold-up problem
when contracts are incomplete (Antràs and Helpman, 2004, 2008).2 A recent branch of this
literature in particular highlights the role of technological intensity in creating hold-up problems
in an outsourcing relationship. Acemoglu et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the technology intensity of the ﬁnal
good producer has a positive eﬀect on the probability of vertical integration (while the opposite is
true for the technological intensity of the intermediate good supplier).3 Grover (2007) interacts the
intensity of the sourced input with technology transfer costs and conﬁrms the results from Antràs
and Helpman (2004, 2008) to only hold for a certain range of technological complexity of the
input. More in line with the approach, Costinot et al. (2011) reinterpret the source of contractual
frictions as arising from the non-routineness of tasks. Since these cannot be fully speciﬁed ex-
ante, ex-post adaptation becomes necessary. Due to better communication and less opportunistic
behavior among aﬃliated parties, outsourcing only takes place for tasks below a certain complexity
threshold. Focusing on the relation between technology and the outsourcing decision, the message
is clear: Higher technology complicates the relation with the supplier and makes it optimal to
vertically integrate. Yet, the role of IPR protection remains absent in these studies.
In this paper, we combine the two strands of literature above starting at the insight that the techno-
logical complexity of an intermediate or ﬁnal good is an alternative determinant of a multinational
1See Saggi (2002) for a review of the early literature on FDI and technology transfers.
2Among the few studies testing these predictions at the ﬁrm-level, Defever and Toubal (2007) and Kohler and
Smolka (2009) conﬁrm the existence of an interaction between input intensity and ﬁrm productivity which shapes
the organizational form of international production.
3Without referring to the property rights theory, Abramovsky and Griﬃth (2006) come to the opposite conclusion.
Past investments in information and communication technologies enable ﬁrms to purchase business service inputs
from independent suppliers abroad as they lower transaction and adjustment costs.
1ﬁrm’s choice between in-house production and outsourcing. Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009)
suggest that past literature has focused too much on hold-up ineﬃciencies as the main drivers
of the internalization decision and underline the importance of the eﬀects of the nonappropriable
nature of knowledge on the internalization decision of ﬁrms. In contrast to the existing studies,
we depart from the hold-up problem but emphasize the interaction between the complexity of
the sourced good and the IPR protection prevailing in the host country. We build a theoretical
framework in which heterogeneous ﬁrms tend to outsource low complex goods. As complexity
rises, ﬁrms are confronted with a trade-oﬀ between higher marginal costs in the case of trade with
a related party and higher imitation risks in the case of sourcing from an independent supplier.
Stronger IPR protection in the source country reduces costs associated with the imitation risk,
while a higher endowment of skills (absorptive capacity) reduces the costs of technology transfer.
Moreover, ﬁrms endowed with better technologies are clearly in a better position to face the ex-
tra costs associated with outsourcing. We show that a three-dimensional heterogeneity, namely
complexity at the product-level, productivity at the ﬁrm-level, and IPR protection at the country-
level, build up the decision of a multinational whether to outsource a product or acquire it through
intra-group trade.
We test these propositions using data from a French survey which provides information on import
transactions at the product-level of multinational ﬁrms and their sourcing mode by country. This
information is merged with balance sheet and income statement data from which we compute
ﬁrm-level productivity. The French data have the advantage to deal with ﬁrms that are part of a
multinational network. This allows us to model the decision of ﬁrms with a related party in a given
country whether or not to acquire their inputs from a foreign outside supplier. We argue that this
choice is inﬂuenced by the level of IPR and the level of complexity of the sourced products.
We derive the complexity of a product group by merging three diﬀerent data sets, (i) ratings of
occupations by their intensities in ‘problem solving’ from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupa-
tional Information Network, (ii) employment shares of occupations by sectors from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics and (iii) French make tables from Eurostat.
We use a fractional logit model to account for the fact that our response variable is bounded
between one and zero. The estimation results conﬁrm the model’s prediction that the probability
of outsourcing increases with the productivity of a ﬁrm and decreases with the complexity of the
good. The imitation risk of the source country matters as better IPR protection increases the
probability of outsourcing. Likewise, better absorptive capacity increases the propensity to out-
source by decreasing the costs of technology transfer. A sample split conﬁrms IPR protection to
only be relevant when ﬁrms outsource highly complex products.
The closest work to ours is Berkowitz et al. (2006), which shows higher quality legal institutions
located in the exporter’s country to enhance international trade in complex products. They argue
this to be due to a production cost eﬀect, assuming the production of complex products to contain
some degree of outsourcing, and hence depend on contracts. Better institutions enable the export-
ing country to cheaply and quickly enforce contracts and resolve business disputes by reducing the
likelihood of hold-up on the production chain and will therefore also lower the production costs of
complex products. Since these issues are less important for simple goods, better legal institutions
enhance a country’s comparative advantage in complex goods.4 While Berkowitz et al. (2006)
4Ivus (2010, 2011) takes the opposite perspective and investigates the impact of improved IPRs in the destination
country on exports. At the extensive margin, stronger IPRs encourage Northern ﬁrms to start exporting which
expands the range of goods industries involved in trade. At the intensive margin, exports in industries with the
highest risk of imitation rise, while exports in other industries may fall (Ivus, 2011). Developed countries’ exports
in patent-sensitive industries increases thereby the most in industries that rely heavily on patent protection (Ivus,
2study the general impact of institutions on international trade in complex products, we explore
the importance of a speciﬁc institution for the type of trade (intra- versus extra-group) undertaken
by a ﬁrm with an exporting country. In addition, we use a speciﬁc measure of product complex-
ity more adequate for our aim to diﬀerentiate products with respect to their technology content,
whereas Berkowitz et al. (2006) use the Rauch (1999) classiﬁcation to distinguish between simple
and complex products. Finally, we base our study on the imitation risk faced by a multinational
ﬁrm instead of contract-related issues, which has served as the basis of the outsourcing decisions
in the previous literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the proposed theory, Section 3-6
introduce the data, the empirical methodology, the descriptive statistics, and estimation results
respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
We start by developing a simple theoretical framework, which helps us pinning down the main
idea. Consider a world with J countries, in which a multinational ﬁrm already active in a country
j ∈ {1..J} can procure intermediate or ﬁnal goods from a related party (insource) or outsource
production to an independent supplier: X ∈ {V,O}. Three diﬀerent sources of heterogeneity drive
the selection of ﬁrms into the diﬀerent organizational modes: Firms are heterogeneous in the spirit
of Melitz (2003) with respect to their technology, φ, products are heterogeneous with respect to
their complexity, z, and countries are heterogeneous with respect to their protection of IPRs, λ,
and their absorptive capacity, δ.
2.1. Consumption












where x(ω) refers to the quantity and zκ(ω) refers to the technological complexity of variety ω.
Subscript κ ∈ (L;H) distinguishes between simple (non-complex) products, and more technolog-
ically sophisticated ones that maintain a continuous measure of complexity. In the rest of the
paper, we normalize the basic level of complexity to one, i.e. zL(ω) = 1. Referring to the literature
on product quality (see Hallak, 2006, Hallak and Sivadasan, 2009 and Crozet et al., 2009), the pa-
rameter γ ∈ (0;1) captures consumer preferences for more technologically sophisticated products.



















as the price-complexity index.
2010).
32.2. Production
Multinational ﬁrms operate under monopolistic competition. Suppliers in country j transform
homogeneous labor, the only factor of production, into intermediate or ﬁnal goods that are sold
to multinational ﬁrms at a price equal to marginal costs. Basic goods production involves only
wage costs, wj. Under insourcing (V ), the multinational ﬁrm owns its supplier and has to pay –
in line with empirical ﬁndings – a wage premium, α = w
wj > 1, over the wage level in country j.
Outsourcing (O) implies marginal cost savings, where independent suppliers pay local wages, hence,
α = 1. Since basic goods production does not involve any ﬁxed cost, sourcing from independent
suppliers involves a (variable) cost advantage and is, generally, preferred over that from related
parties.




where 0 < λj ≤ 1 denotes the level of IPRs with a higher λj indicating stronger protection. Notice
that for simple goods rj(ω) = zL(ω)
1
λj = 1, which implies the irrelevance of IPRs when products
do not contain sophisticated technologies to be imitated. On the other hand, imitation costs are
increasing in the level of complexity,
∂rj(ω)




λj ≥ 1 accounts for the fact that highly complex products are especially sensitive and
require more protection. An increase in IPR protection lowers the imitation risk outsourcers face
in country j, and this eﬀect is stronger for complex products.5 Multinationals own the property
rights over the available technology in their aﬃliate. Insourcing therefore does not confront them
with the risk of being imitated, hence rj(ω) = 1.6
Complex goods production also involves a ﬁxed technology transfer cost T(δj), which can be
thought of as an eﬀort to achieve a better ﬁt of the independent supplier’s production to the
multinational ﬁrm’s needs. We assume zero technology transfer costs under integration. δj denotes
the absorptive capacity in country j, where a higher δj indicates more advanced local skills, hence
better capacity by an independent supplier to learn and perform the customization required by a
multinational. Technology transfer costs are therefore decreasing with absorptive capacity,
∂T(δj)
∂δj <
0. Since this cost is sunk, outsourcers are confronted with the risk of their transferred technology
being imitated.









with φ as the productivity a ﬁrm draws from a common distribution G(φ). Multinational ﬁrms




















6Note that limλ→1 rj(ω) = 1, hence, the assumption that multinational ﬁrms fully control their intellectual
property within ﬁrm boundaries is equivalent to country j providing full IPR protection.





EPσ−1 and using equations (2),
(4) and (5), we derive the proﬁts under both modes:
















zκ(ω)γ(σ−1)σ−1 − T(δj). (6b)
While both proﬁt functions are increasing in productivity level, φ, proﬁts under outsourcing












. T(δj) ensures the existence of a
product-country speciﬁc productivity cut-oﬀ that is given by equating (6a) and (6b):














The cut-oﬀ is decreasing in α and increasing in zκ(ω), as long as the cost parameters associated with
complexity exceed the consumers’ strength of preference for complexity. Note that productivity of





1 − α < 0 ⇒   φ < 0. The probability that a ﬁrm with complex products decides to outsource is
then given by the probability that it draws a productivity above the product- and country-speciﬁc
cut-oﬀ,






















The above equation suggests that a higher mark-up adjusted demand level, A, lower competition,
σ, lower relative marginal cost advantage in the form of a high α, and higher absorptive capacity,
δj, decrease the productivity cut-oﬀ and thereby increase the probability that a multinational
sources a product from independent suppliers.
Testable Implications 1. For simple products, product-level complexity, ﬁrm-level productivity,
and country-level IPRs are irrelevant in the mode through which a multinational ﬁrm acquires a
product. Firms are generally less inclined to outsource production of complex goods to independent
suppliers, but are more likely to do so for (i) higher levels of IPR protection in the host country,
(ii) higher levels of ﬁrm productivity, (iii) higher levels of absorptive capacity in the host country.
Proof Follows directly from equation (8) and the properties of product complexity zL(ω) = 1.
3. Data
We test the above developed hypothesis with data on the trade organization of French ﬁrms. The
rich product and geographical breakdown of the data allows us to match it with a complexity
measure at the product-level and an IPR index at the country-level.
53.1. Sourcing Mode
To capture the share of intra- and extra-group trade, we rely on information from a conﬁdential
ﬁrm-level survey, the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) con-
ducted in 1999. The survey provides information on the trade organization of French ﬁrms.7 It
is addressed to all French multinational ﬁrms which trade more than one million Euro and which
are owned by manufacturing groups that control at least 50% of the equity capital of a foreign
aﬃliate.
The survey provides a detailed geographical breakdown of French ﬁrms’ imports at the product-
level (HS4 or CPA) as well as their sourcing modes – through independent suppliers and/or related
parties. There are 2514 ﬁrms in the baseline sample. A French intra-group transaction is deﬁned
as trade with a related party which is either directly controlled by the ﬁrm (ﬁrm’s aﬃliates) or
controlled by the group to which the ﬁrm belongs (group’s aﬃliates). Both types of intra-group
transactions are treated as ’insourcing’ in our theoretical framework and imply no risk of imitation.
3.2. Product Complexity
Our measure of product complexity is similar to Costinot et al. (2011) and Keller and Yeaple
(2009). The U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Information Network (O*NET) provides
expert information on the importance and the level of complex problem solving skills for 809 eight
digit occupations as deﬁned in the Standard Occupational Classiﬁcation (SOC). Each occupation,




where the weights, α and β, give the contributions of the two complexity components, importance
i ∈ [1,5] and level l ∈ [0,7].8
In line with Costinot et al. (2011), we assume that every country in the sample uses the same
technology and rely therefore on employment information from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES). The 1999 data contains the number of employees by
occupation in every three digit industry k (according to the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation
(SIC)).9 The occupational intensity, bk







o is the employment level of occupation o in industry k. Although the SIC gathers data
on those organizations, which work with or produce the same product or service under the same
industry heading, it does not relate atypical products. By exploiting information on primary and
secondary outputs of the French 1999 make table from Eurostat, we derive a precise product
complexity measure,10
7échanges internationaux intra-groupe.
8We tried diﬀerent weights that have been used in the literature (see Blinder, 2009 and Jensen and Kletzer,










9Crop production, animal production and private households are not surveyed. After matching the O*NET data
to the OES data, 695 occupations remain in the sample.
10Since direct concordance tables of the NACE Rev. 1.1 classiﬁcation and the SIC 1987 classiﬁcation are not












k x(ω) gives the share of industry k in the production of each product. Table A.1 summa-
rizes the 32 product categories in our sample ranked according to their complexity.
3.3. Other Explanatory Variables
The SESSI11 survey does not provide information on ﬁrms’ characteristics. We retrieve the infor-
mation necessary to compute ﬁrm-level Total Factor Productivity (TFP) from the EAE12 database.
The data can be merged directly with the SESSI data thanks to a common ﬁrm identiﬁer. The
EAE contains information on the balance sheets and income statements of all ﬁrms located in
France that have more than 20 employees from 1996 to 1999. It has ﬁrm-level information on
sales, capital, labor and intermediates use, as well as the four digit NAF700 sector classiﬁcation of
the ﬁrm.13 We calculate TFP following the semiparametric approach of Olley and Pakes (1996),
which corrects for the endogeneity of ﬁrms’ input choices.
We restrict our analysis to manufacturing sectors. However, we do not consider the manufacture
of food products, beverages and tobacco because the EAE has no information for these sectors.
We exclude ﬁrms active in the manufacture of coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel
since the sourcing modes in this industry are likely to be determined by factors such as national
sovereignty (Antràs, 2003).
We have a measure of IPR protection from Park (2008) for the destination country. This measure of
IPR protection is the updated version of the worldwide used Ginarte and Park index (Ginarte and
Park, 1997). It incorporates the eﬀects of the TRIPS agreements of 1995 and it takes into account
the revisions in national patent laws required to conform to international and regional agreements
(such as the North American free trade agreement (NAFTA), European patent convention (EPC),
African Regional industrial property organization (ARIPO), Cartagena agreement, among others).
All the technical details related to the construction of the index are in Park (2008). We measure
the strength of IPR protection in 1995 (and 2000) which is available for 64 countries of the sample.
Table A.2 summarizes the information for the countries of our sample.
Information on the population share with completed secondary education for 1995 comes from
Barro and Lee (2010) and serves as a proxy for a country’s absorptive capacity. As outlined in
Section 2.2, we assume that higher absorptive capacity reduces the sunk technology transfer costs
since it facilitates the training of the supplier. We calculate the wage premium aﬃliates pay as the
diﬀerence between French wages and source country wages by industry in 1998. Both variables
are taken from the CEPII Trade, Production and Bilateral Protection Database. We additionally
employ a range of gravity variables, such as distance, GDP, the existence of a common oﬃcial
language or a common legal origin. All these variables are provided by CEPII.
11Service des Études et des Statistiques Industrielles.
12Enquête d’Annuelle d’Entreprises: annual French ﬁrm-level survey.
13Nomenclature d’Activité Française: nomenclature of French activities.
74. Empirical Methodology
We start with the observation that not all ﬁrms in our sample entirely rely on one or the other
sourcing strategy. In 13.06% of all cases, ﬁrms use mixed strategies even for sourcing the same
product from the same country. To account for this, we use the share of an input that is imported
by a multinational from an independent supplier located in a foreign country as the dependent
variable. This share lies within the [0;1] interval. Because many values are still at the boundaries,
we use a fractional response model as in Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
The next issue to resolve is that the SESSI survey includes multinational ﬁrms, which by deﬁnition,
have at least one related party located abroad. This does not exclude the possibility that ﬁrms may
only engage in outsourcing in a given country without having a related party there. However, our
model aims at comparing the ’proportion’ of business undertaken through an existing related party
(intra-group trade) with that outsourced to a foreign supplier, given the complexity of the sourced
product and the IPR protection level prevailing in the source country. The relevant measure of
comparison is therefore the proportion of outsourcing versus intra-group trade, only when the ﬁrm
has an already existing related party in a given country.
To correct for this, we follow Defever and Toubal (2010) and implement a two-stage estimation
procedure. In the ﬁrst stage, we analyze the likelihood of having a related party in the foreign
country. This methodology is only valid if we can identify determinants of the binary selection
variable outside the estimating equation, which explain the probability of having a related party.
We identify two ﬁrm-level variables that are correlated with the presence of a related party and
not with the sourcing choice: the number of French related parties, and a dummy variable that
indicates whether a ﬁrm is owned by an Ultimate Beneﬁal Owner (UBO).14 Our speciﬁcation
also includes gravity determinants such as market size (GDP), distance, border, oﬃcial language
and common legal origin.15 Furthermore, we add measures of trade and FDI openness from the
Heritage Foundation and an entry cost variable in line with Djankov et al. (2002). We also control
for the ﬁrm’s TFP. The second stage estimates on the sourcing choice include the inverse Mills
ratio from the ﬁrst stage.
Since the dependent variable is measured at the transaction-level, while our main variables of
interest are measured at the product- (complexity) and at the country- (IPR) level, the i.i.d.
assumption is unlikely to hold. We correct the standard errors by employing two-way clustering
at the product- and country-level (see Cameron et al., 2006).
5. Descriptive Statistics
This section presents descriptive statistics based on the sample of the second stage, i.e. including
transactions only if ﬁrms have a choice between relying on a related party or an outside supplier
in a given country.
Table 1 shows the means (main values) and the standard deviations (values in parentheses) of the
key variables of interest. In order to compare the two sourcing modes, we assign the value of 1 if
the outsourcing share is ≥ 0.5 (outsourcing) and the value of 0 (insourcing) otherwise.
The descriptive statistics conﬁrm that the average complexity level of a sourced product is higher in
intra-group than in outsourcing relations. Further, outsourcing takes place, on average, more with
14We retrieve this information from the LIFI data, merged using a common ﬁrm identiﬁer.
15The distance and border variable are computed using the location of the ﬁrm in France.
8Table 1: Summary statistics
Intra-group trade Extra-group trade Total
Complexity 0.272 0.268 0.270
(0.0603) (0.0574) (0.0585)
IPR 4.145 4.274 4.227
(0.656) (0.477) (0.553)
Abs. capacity 23.80 24.75 24.40
(11.75) (11.15) (11.39)
TFP, lag 5.351 5.468 5.425
(0.908) (0.965) (0.946)
Wage diﬀ. 1.736 1.546 1.625
(1.136) (1.057) (1.094)
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of ﬁrms with group aﬃliates in the source country. The main
statistics are the means of the explanatory variables by mode. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Source: Own calculations.
suppliers from countries that exhibit better IPR enforcement and superior absorptive capacity.
Finally, the average outsourcing transaction involves ﬁrms that are more productive compared
to those that purchase from aﬃliates. These summary statistics are in line with our theoretical
predictions that suggest IPR, absorptive capacity and productivity to be particularly relevant for
outsourcers, which face higher imitation risks and technology transfer costs, than ﬁrms dealing
with related aﬃliates.
Table 2: Correlation matrix
Complexity IPR Abs. capacity TFP, lag Wage diﬀ.
Complexity - 0.0678 0.0086 -0.0120 0.0225
IPR 0.2057 - 0.1829 -0.0392 -0.5979
Abs. capacity 0.0561 0.1997 - -0.0658 0.1788
TFP, lag -0.0606 -0.1043 -0.0613 - -0.0280
Wage diﬀ. -0.0427 -0.5168 0.2477 0.0152 -
Note: This table presents correlations between the main explanatory variables for the sample of ﬁrms with group aﬃliates
in the source country. The correlations are calculated by mode. The upper triangle gives the correlations for intra-group
trade-ﬁrms, the lower triangle gives the correlations for extra-group trade ﬁrms.
Source: Own calculations.
Table 2 displays the correlations among the main explanatory variables, separately for ﬁrms that
source from within (upper triangle) and outside (lower triangle) ﬁrm boundaries. We observe a
positive correlation between IPR and complexity and between absorptive capacity and complex-
ity, especially in the case of outsourcing. This strengthens our predictions about the impact of
these variables: Firms appear to source technologically intensive goods from independent suppliers
only in locations where high IPR protection lowers their risk of being imitated and where a high
educational level lowers their costs of transferring technology. Absorptive capacity and TFP are
negatively correlated, suggesting that productive ﬁrms can aﬀord to source from countries with
less human capital.
Figure 1 depicts the positive correlation between the IPR level and the outsourcing share. The
upward sloping ﬁtting line indicates that the outsourcing share is, on average, higher in countries
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Note: 10: Coal & lignite; peat; 11: Crude petrol. & natural gas; services incidental to oil; 12: Uranium & thorium ores; 13: Metal ores; 14:
Other mining & quarrying products; 15: Food products & beverages; 16: Tobacco products; 17: Textiles; 18: Wearing apparel; furs; 19: Leather
& leather products; 20: Wood & products of wood & cork (excp. furniture); artic; 21: Pulp, paper & paper products; 22: Printed matter &
recorded media; 23: Coke, reﬁned petroleum products & nuclear fuels; 24: Chemicals, chemical products & man-made ﬁbres; 25: Rubber &
plastic products; 26: Other non-metallic mineral products; 27: Basic metals; 28: Fabricated metal products, except machinery & equipment;
29: Machinery & equipment n.e.c.; 30: Oﬃce machinery & computers; 31: Electrical machinery & apparatus n.e.c.; 32: Radio, television &
communication equipment & apparatus; 33: Medical, precision & optical instruments, watches and clocks; 34: Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-
trailers; 35: Other transport equipment; 36: Furniture; other manufactured goods n.e.c.; 40: Electrical energy, gas, steam & hot water; 50: Trade,
maint. & repair services of motor vehicles & mtr; 72: Computer & related services; 74: Other business services; 92: Recreational, cultural &
sporting services.
10with stronger IPR protection. Countries, which receive high shares of outsourcing (e.g. Germany,
Belgium, USA), are also among the countries that rank highest according to the Park index. By
contrast, French multinationals highly rely on related parties when sourcing from countries with
lower IPR levels (e.g. India, Jordan).
The correlation between complexity and the average outsourcing share by product group is negative
as Figure 2 shows. Basic products, such as tobacco (16), are generally imported from independent
suppliers, whereas complex products, such as IT- and telecommunication-related products (30, 32,
72) are largely, sourced from related suppliers.
6. Estimation Results
We start our empirical analyses with presenting the baseline results on the entire sample before
splitting the sample to test for the proposed non-linearities in product complexity. We complement
our analyses with various robustness checks.
6.1. Preliminarily Results
In Section 2.2, we have modeled the imports of intermediate inputs as a decision between two
sourcing modes. Firms can import an intermediate input from a given country using an outside
foreign supplier or from their own related party located there. There are, however, some ﬁrms that
do not face this choice because they do not have a related party in a particular country. This is so
because even if all ﬁrms in the sample have at least one related party located somewhere abroad,
they may still import some products from outside suppliers in a country where they do not have
a related party. We expect outsourcing in such countries to be mainly driven by marginal-cost-
savings, and imports to involve simple goods making the level of IPRs irrelevant.
In this section, we do not apply the selection methodology and run preliminary regressions on the
full sample of 66,935 observations. We pool all types of transactions irrespective of the presence
of a related party. The results are reported in Table 3. Indeed, our results show that IPRs
do not matter for the location choice across countries when simply deciding where to outsource
the production of a given good. The negative and signiﬁcant correlation between outsourcing
and complexity supports our hypothesis that this is because such pure location decisions involve
simple goods. Our analysis in the following section therefore takes another step to investigate
the importance of IPRs in the choice between acquiring products (of diﬀerent complexity) from a
related party or an outside supplier in a given country.
6.2. Baseline Results
Table 4 reports the marginal eﬀects of the two stage approach. In the ﬁrst stage, we report the
estimates of a probit model that analyzes the likelihood of ﬁnding a related party in a given foreign
country. In the second stage, we analyze the eﬀects of IPR and product complexity on the share
of outsourcing and include the inverse Mills ratio from the ﬁrst stage in the diﬀerent models. The
sign on the inverse Mills ratio indicates the nature of the correlation between the errors in the
selection equation and the second stage equation. In our case, it is negative and highly signiﬁcant
irrespective of the estimated speciﬁcation. This suggests that those ﬁrms most likely to have a
foreign related party are also less likely to source from an independent supplier.
The estimates of the ﬁrst stage equation reveal that the presence of a related party is determined by
the number of French related parties and the nationality of the UBO. As expected, both covariates
11Table 3: Basic results without selection (marginal eﬀects presented).
Variables (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (S6) (S7)
IPR -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019 0.007 0.031b
(-1.270) (-1.304) (-1.424) (-1.323) (0.555) (2.405)
Product complexity -0.353a -0.354a -0.356a -0.389a -0.402a -0.410a
(-3.149) (-3.057) (-3.070) (-3.285) (-3.424) (-3.033)
Abs. Capacity 0.008 0.008 -0.004 -0.012
(1.5) (1.484) (-0.455) (-0.959)
TFP, lag 0.027a 0.027b 0.041a
(2.593) (2.518) (2.906)






Obs. 66,935 66,935 66,935 66,935 66,935 66,917 23,745
Pseudo R2 0.0236 0.0242 0.0247 0.0249 0.0269 0.0286 0.0309
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering around the country and product identity in the
second stage. t-statistics in parentheses. a, b , c signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
enter signiﬁcantly and positively in the selection equation. The estimate of ﬁrm’s TFP is small and
statistically insigniﬁcant. This suggests that the decision of setting up a related party in a certain
country is not taken by the ﬁrm itself but rather by the group to which the ﬁrm belongs. With the
exception of GDP and distance, most gravity determinants are insigniﬁcant. We ﬁnd, however,
that policies towards FDI, as captured by the FDI openness variable, aﬀect the probability of
having a foreign related party positively. The entry costs variable shows the expected negative
impact.
The results of the second stage equation are reported in columns (S1) to (S7). The estimates of
the IPR and complexity variables are particularly robust across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. They
are both in line with our theoretical expectation. In particular, we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
impact of IPR on the outsourcing share with a marginal eﬀect of 0.05 in speciﬁcation (S6). The
estimate of the complexity variable is also signiﬁcant. The marginal eﬀect is negative and ranges
from -0.374 to -0.439.16
In column (S4), we introduce the absorptive capacity of a country. This variable, measured as
the percentage of a country’s population that has completed at least secondary schooling, is an
approximation of the costs incurred by the ex-ante technology transfer. The marginal eﬀect is
positive and signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is in line with equation (6) which suggests that the technology
transfer costs to customize the input to the multinational ﬁrm’s needs accrue only in the case of
outsourcing. A higher absorptive capacity lowers this cost and favors thereby outsourcing.17
In column (S5), we add the one-year lagged TFP level of the French multinational. The marginal
eﬀect is positive and signiﬁcant. It suggests that most productive multinational ﬁrms are more
16Column (S7) is an exception since it includes wage diﬀerences and is for this reason, estimated for a substantially
reduced sample.
17The result is in line with previous studies: Bernard et al. (2010) report empirical evidence that a country’s
greater skill abundance reduces the share of intra-ﬁrm trade of US ﬁrms. Grover (2007) develops a theoretical model
according to which intra-ﬁrm trade falls relative to extra-ﬁrm trade as absorptive capacity rises.
12Table 4: Impact of complexity and IPR regimes on the sourcing choice (marginal eﬀects presented).
Variables (First Stage) (Second Stage)
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (S6) (S7)
IPR 0.072a 0.036b 0.035b 0.032b 0.033b 0.05a 0.079b
(6.08) (2.384) (2.288) (2.215) (2.319) (2.681) (2.112)
Product complexity 0.345a -0.389a -0.374a -0.382a -0.425a -0.439a -0.61a
(3.015) (-3.404) (-3.314) (-3.340) (-3.758) (-3.873) (-3.665)
Abs. Capacity 0.001 0.023a 0.023a 0.014c 0.003
(0.148) (3.809) (3.731) (1.696) (0.147)
TFP, lag 0.001 0.034b 0.034b 0.057a





















UBO, foreign group 0.259a
(10.149)






Inverse Mills -0.3a -0.336a -0.308a -0.317a -0.313a -0.315a -0.321a
(-10.04) (-12.19) (-9.976) (-11.37) (-10.94) (-10.99) (-9.447)
Obs. 66,935 39,636 39,636 39,636 39,636 39,636 39,635 14,978
Pseudo R2 0.166 0.0525 0.0524 0.0534 0.0548 0.0571 0.0578 0.0697
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering around the country and product identity in the second stage. The
standard error are clustered at ﬁrm level in the ﬁrst stage equation. t-statistics in parentheses. a, b , c signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
likely to outsource. In line with our theoretical framework, productive ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier to
overcome the technology transfer costs and tend to outsource a higher share of their international
activities.
The IPR regime and the decision to source complex inputs may be correlated with some host
country characteristics such as the corruption level and the level of investment risk. As Javorcik
(2004) points out, multinational ﬁrms are less likely to operate with their aﬃliates in risky and
corrupt countries. We include these additional variables in the estimation. The investment risk
variable is the 1999 ICRG investment proﬁle. It provides information on contract viability and
expropriation, proﬁts repatriation and payment delays.18 We ﬁnd that lower investment risk favors
outsourcing. The corruption index is the 1999 Transparency International Corruption Perception
Index which pools information from ten diﬀerent surveys of business executives, risk analysts and
18A higher index indicates a lower risk of investment.
13the general public. The estimate is small and insigniﬁcant. The corruption level does not inﬂuence
the sourcing mode of French multinationals. While the eﬀect of corruption is insigniﬁcant, the
introduction of the investment risk variable yields a more precise estimation of the IPR estimates.
In column (S7), we additionally control for the wage diﬀerence between the home country, France,
and the source countries, J. Since the wage diﬀerence is positive only for less developed countries
whilst the major part of French ﬁrms’ imports come from well developed countries such as Germany
and the US, the inclusion of the variable in logs results in a loss of over 50% of all observations.
Although we do not ﬁnd the predicted positive impact of the wage diﬀerence on the outsourcing
share, it is interesting to observe that the eﬀects of complexity and the IPR protection level become
stronger for this sample.19 The country’s absorptive capacity and the quality of its business
environment now turn out to have no impact on the outsourcing share. The corruption variable is
negative and estimated with a very low degree of precision.
As shown by Hanson et al. (2005), the trade activities of multinational ﬁrms involve intermediate
inputs which are a key element of their global production network. We analyze the eﬀect of IPR
and complexity on the outsourcing decision of intermediate products. In Appendix B, Table B.1
reports the marginal eﬀects using a sample containing intermediate inputs only. We follow the
methodology developed in Defever and Toubal (2007) and identify imported intermediate inputs
as purchased inputs registered in an HS3-digit sector other than the one in which the French
multinational reports its main activity. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in
Table 4. The marginal eﬀects are, however, estimated with a higher level of precision, suggesting
that the sample of intermediate inputs provides a better ﬁt for our analysis.
6.3. Simple vs. Complex Products
We ﬁnd that the level of complexity has, on average, a negative impact on the outsourcing share. A
greater level of complexity should deter outsourcing because complex products are associated with
a higher risk of imitation. According to equation (3), the decision to source products with a very
high degree of complexity from an outside supplier should be strongly inﬂuenced by the level of
IPR protection. In Table 5, we investigate the eﬀect of IPR and complexity on the sourcing mode,
separately for high and low complex products. Table 5 reports the second stage equation, the
estimation of the selection equation is similar to the one presented in Table 4. The sample of high
complexity products corresponds to all transactions with a level of complexity which is above the
complexity variable median value (z = 0.279). The estimated marginal eﬀects are presented in the
upper Panel A of Table 5. We report the results of the low complexity sample in the lower Panel
B. As in the baseline regressions, we ﬁnd that the inverse Mills ratios are statistically signiﬁcant
and negative in both subsamples.
The results of Table 5 show striking diﬀerences with respect to the eﬀect of IPR on low and high
complexity products. While for a high level of complexity, the levels of IPR and complexity are
relevant for the sourcing decision, they do not appear to be relevant for low complexity levels.
In Panel A, the marginal eﬀects of the IPR variables are signiﬁcant and vary from 0.05 to 0.073.
We additionally ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant impact of the complexity variable. Interestingly,
the marginal eﬀects of the IPR and complexity variables are larger than the ones reported in
Table 4. These results suggest that the levels of IPR and complexity are even more important for
the sourcing decision of highly complex products. The human capital endowment does not lower
technology transfer costs for highly complex products. Notice, that the marginal eﬀect of the IPR
192/3 of imports in this restricted sample come from Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.
14variable is more important in this speciﬁcation. As suggested by our testable implications, ﬁrms
need a certain productivity level to overcome the ﬁxed costs associated with the sourcing of high
complex goods from independent suppliers. The positive and signiﬁcant marginal eﬀect in Panel
A conﬁrms this.
Table 5: Outsourcing and the non-linear impact of complexity (marginal eﬀects presented).
Panel A: high level of complexity
IPR 0.055a 0.052b 0.05b 0.051b 0.073a 0.172a
(2.644) (2.486) (2.512) (2.558) (2.995) (4.489)
Product complexity -0.686b -0.618c -0.604c -0.688b -0.693b -1.013c
(-2.024) (-1.815) (-1.765) (-1.982) (-2.000) (-1.839)
Abs. Capacity 0.021a 0.021a 0.012 -0.009
(3.743) (3.639) (1.244) (-0.532)
TFP, lag 0.037b 0.037b 0.052a
(2.4) (2.398) (2.848)






Inverse Mills -0.256a -0.304a -0.257a -0.267a -0.255a -0.26a -0.263a
(-6.298) (-7.747) (-6.295) (-6.906) (-6.479) (-6.672) (-5.414)
Obs. 20,961 20,961 20,961 20,961 20,961 20,960 7,744
R2 0.0691 0.0679 0.07 0.0711 0.0734 0.0742 0.0972
Panel B: low level of complexity
IPR 0.011 0.013 0.009 0.012 0.024 0.021
(0.497) (0.554) (0.4) (0.534) (0.924) (0.56)
Product complexity -0.367 -0.378 -0.395 -0.455 -0.473 -1.001b
(-1.016) (-1.045) (-1.089) (-1.191) (-1.248) (-2.239)
Abs. Capacity 0.025a 0.025a 0.016c -0.001
(4.517) (4.303) (1.723) (0.080)
TFP, lag 0.034 0.034 0.063b
(1.385) (1.392) (2.491)






Inverse Mills -0.343a -0.358a -0.349a -0.358a -0.357a -0.359a -0.368a
(-10.559) (-11.818) (-10.883) (-12.147) (-12.309) (-12.503) (-9.337)
Obs. 18,675 18,675 18,675 18,675 18,675 18,675 7,234
R2 0.0461 0.0465 0.0466 0.0482 0.051 0.0518 0.0621
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering around the country and product identity in the
second stage. First stage regression as in Table 4. t-statistics in parentheses. a, b , c signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Concerning the results presented in Panel B, we still ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
15absorptive capacity. A country’s endowment with human capital favors the outsourcing of low
complex goods. Conﬁrming our testable implications, the productivity of a ﬁrm is irrelevant for
the sourcing of low complex goods. Since we assume that basic good production does not involve
high ﬁxed costs, ﬁrms at all levels of productivity can outsource the production of these goods.
Table B.2 in Appendix B reports the marginal eﬀects using the intermediate inputs sample. The
results are qualitatively similar and estimated with a higher degree of precision.
6.4. Robustness Checks
We provide two robustness checks: First, we use the Rauch (1999) classiﬁcation to challenge our
measurement of product complexity. Second, we employ the average measure of IPR enforcement
for the period under study.
Berkowitz et al. (2006) and Rajan and Lee (2007) reinterpret Rauch’s product classiﬁcation in
terms of product complexity. Rauch (1999) classiﬁes the four digit industries into diﬀerent trading
categories. Some products are quoted on organized exchanges, while others are quoted in trade
publications, i.e. they are reference priced. We denote these two categories by homogenous prod-
ucts. Rauch classiﬁes also other goods that are not homogenous. These products are “suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated that prices cannot convey enough of the information relevant for international trade:
buyers and sellers must be matched in characteristics space” (Rauch, 2001, p. 1187). Berkowitz
et al. (2006) and Rajan and Lee (2007) assume that homogenous products hold a lower level of
complexity than diﬀerentiated products. We depart a little from their interpretation. The ho-
mogenous products category might also exhibit variation in product complexity (from pork to
chemicals). But the levels of complexity or IPR for homogenous goods should not inﬂuence the
choice of sourcing because the goods are standardized and sold to a wider range of ﬁrms. The
IPR enforcement issue and the level of complexity should be more important for trade in diﬀeren-
tiated products. These goods contain many characteristics that are diﬃcult to fully stipulate in a
contract and the success of the buyers and sellers match is not guaranteed.
In Table 6, we report the marginal eﬀects of the ﬁrst and second stage estimations using this
classiﬁcation. Considering the sample of homogenous products, we do not ﬁnd robust evidence
that the levels of IPR and product complexity aﬀect the sourcing choice.20 We ﬁnd that the levels
of IPR and complexity inﬂuence the outsourcing share of diﬀerentiated products. The estimated
marginal eﬀects are in line with those of the baseline speciﬁcations.
The enforcement of the WTO agreement on the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPS) in 1995 may have changed the ranking of countries according to their IPR protection level.
Even though the Park (2008) index incorporates these changes, the index for 1995 cannot account
for the transition periods that were granted to transition and developing countries (until 2000) and
to developed countries (until 1996) in applying TRIPS. Given these delays, it would be desirable
to use an IPR index at a later date. Since the Park (2008) index was calculated only every ﬁve
years prior to 2000, we use the average between 1995 and 2000.21
The results are presented in Table B.3 in the Appendix. The introduction of the alternative measure
of IPR does not aﬀect the impact of our variables of interest on the outsourcing share. The marginal
eﬀects of the complexity level enter negatively and signiﬁcantly in the second stage equations. We
ﬁnd the average IPR index to have a signiﬁcant and positive impact on the outsourcing share of
20In the reduced sample that includes the wage diﬀerences, the level of IPR is signiﬁcant but only at 10%.
21Other popular measures, like the Heritage Foundation and the Kaufmann et al. (2010) index capture the insti-
tutional quality of a country in general and are, therefore, not suitable to measure imitation risk.
16Table 6: Using the Rauch classiﬁcation (marginal eﬀects presented).
Variables (First Stage) (Second Stage)
Homogenous Diﬀerentiated
IPR 0.072a 0.019 0.043 0.053b 0.082b
(6.08) (0.626) (1.419) (2.485) (2.051)
Product complexity 0.345a 0.488c 0.46 -0.396a -0.546a
(3.015) (1.678) (1.222) (-2.992) (-2.914)
Abs. Capacity 0.001 0.01 -0.026 0.015 0.011
(0.148) (0.974) (-1.510) (1.552) (0.532)
TFP, lag 0.001 -0.004 0.006 0.049a 0.077a

















No. of French related parties 0.164a
(16.756)
UBO, foreign group 0.259a
(10.149)
Investment risk -0.019c -0.014a -0.011 0.000
(-1.719) (-3.050) (-1.515) (0.017)
Corruption 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.026a
(0.437) (-0.170) (-0.610) (-3.207)
Wage diﬀerence -0.01 -0.021
(-0.549) (-1.340)
Inverse Mills -0.296a -0.336a -0.314a -0.307a
(-9.718) (-7.638) (-9.143) (-7.966)
Obs. 66,935 11,004 3,582 30,981 11,992
R2 0.166 0.0394 0.0539 0.0648 0.0756
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering around the country and product identity in the
second stage. The standard error are clustered at ﬁrm-level in the ﬁrst stage equation. t-statistics
in parentheses. a, b , c signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
multinational ﬁrms. The marginal eﬀect is of an order of magnitude larger than the one found in
Table 4. Interestingly, the introduction of the average IPR index renders the absorptive capacity
variable insigniﬁcant.
177. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the decision of multinational groups to source complex goods from
independent or related suppliers. We have developed a theoretical framework that proposes the
complexity of a product and the IPR protection level of a country as alternative determinants for
a ﬁrm’s choice between outsourcing and vertical integration.
As measures of the technological intensity at the product-level are not available, we have built a
new measure reﬂecting the complex problem-solving skills involved in the production of a good.
The estimations conﬁrm the theoretical presumption that ﬁrms use independent suppliers when
sourcing non-complex goods. When sourcing complex goods, costly technology transfer exposes
ﬁrms to the risk of being imitated. This imitation risk increases in the complexity of the imported
good and decreases in the level of IPR protection available in the source country.
The study conﬁrms the hypothesis that ﬁrms outsource highly complex products to countries
where their intellectual property is recognized. While IPR and complexity matter for the mode
choice between sourcing from a related party or an outside supplier in a given country, IPR is
less relevant for the location choice across countries when deciding from where to import a given
simple product. Our ﬁndings are robust when considering intermediate goods, when linking the
results to a diﬀerent deﬁnition of product complexity, and when using an alternative measure of
IPR.
As much as the paper contributes to understanding the internationalization strategy of ﬁrms and
the diﬀerences between intra-ﬁrm trade and outsourcing, it bears an important policy conclusion:
The results suggest that attracting the upper part of the value chain requires building trust into
the protection of IPRs.
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21Appendix A. IPR and Complexity Ranking
Appendix A.1. Product Complexity Ranking
Table A.1: Product complexity ranking
Code Description Complexity
72 Computer & related services .4221271
32 Radio, television & communication equipment & apparatus .3798102
30 Oﬃce machinery & computers .3790194
40 Electrical energy, gas, steam & hot water .3515674
74 Other business services .3246673
29 Machinery & equipment n.e.c. .3113132
31 Electrical machinery & apparatus n.e.c. .3073564
50 Trade, maint. & repair services of motor vehicles & mtrcls; retail sale of auto fuel .3033172
33 Medical, precision & optical instruments, watches and clocks .3031925
92 Recreational, cultural & sporting services .2997497
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery & equipment .2878633
27 Basic metals .2786216
35 Other transport equipment .2748125
12 Uranium & thorium ores .266358
11 Crude petrol. & natural gas; services incidental to oil & gas ext. excl. surveying .2624262
34 Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers .2596836
24 Chemicals, chemical products & man-made ﬁbres .2580898
23 Coke, reﬁned petroleum products & nuclear fuels .2537238
22 Printed matter & recorded media .2342544
10 Coal & lignite; peat .2317005
36 Furniture; other manufactured goods n.e.c. .2246486
13 Metal ores .2134478
25 Rubber & plastic products .205822
15 Food products & beverages .1978979
14 Other mining & quarrying products .1938014
26 Other non-metallic mineral products .1839178
20 Wood & products of wood & cork (excp. furniture); articles of straw & plaiting matls .1745415
17 Textiles .167882
19 Leather & leather products .1651444
21 Pulp, paper & paper products .1634918
18 Wearing apparel; furs .1262338
16 Tobacco products .1146149
Source: Own calculations.
22Appendix A.2. List of Countries and IPR Level
Table A.2: List of countries and IPR level
Argentina 2.73 Germany 4.17 Mexico 3.14 Spain 4.21
Australia 4.17 Ghana 2.83 Morocco 1.78 Sri Lanka 2.98
Austria 4.21 Greece 3.47 Netherlands 4.54 Sweden 4.42
Belgium 4.54 Hungary 4.04 New Zealand 4.01 Switzerland 4.21
Bolivia 2.37 India 1.23 Norway 3.88 Tanzania 2.32
Brazil 1.48 Indonesia 1.56 Pakistan
(1972-)
1.38 Thailand 2.41
Bulgaria 3.23 Ireland 4.14 Panama 1.46 Tunisia 1.65
Canada 4.34 Israel 3.14 Peru 2.73 Turkey 2.65
Chile 3.91 Italy 4.33 Philippines 2.56 Ukraine 3.68
China 2.12 Jamaica 2.86 Poland 3.46 United King-
dom
4.54
Colombia 2.74 Japan 4.42 Portugal 3.35 United States 4.88
Czech Republic 2.96 Jordan 1.08 Romania 3.52 Uruguay 2.07
Denmark 4.54 Kenya 2.43 Russia 3.48 Venezuela 2.82
Ecuador 2.04 Korea, South 3.89 Singapore 3.88 Vietnam 2.9
Egypt 1.73 Lithuania 2.69 Slovakia 2.96 Zambia 1.62
Finland 4.42 Malaysia 2.7 South Africa 3.39 Zimbabwe 2.28
List of countries in the full sample. Level of Intellectual Property Rights for 1995.
23Appendix B. Additional Empirical Results
Table B.1: Impact of complexity and IPR regimes on the sourcing choice intermediate products (marginal eﬀects
presented).
Variables (First Stage) (Second Stage)
(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (S6) (S7)
IPR 0.069a 0.042a 0.04a 0.038a 0.039a 0.057a 0.113a
(4.948) (3.43) (3.199) (3.412) (3.409) (4.01) (3.993)
Product complexity 0.379a -0.522a -0.508a -0.518a -0.545a -0.550a -0.623a
(3.487) (-4.649) (-4.577) (-4.634) (-4.925) (-4.950) (-3.775)
Abs. Capacity 0.005 0.023a 0.024a 0.016b 0.001
(0.665) (5.308) (5.364) (2.548) (0.08)
TFP, lag 0.005 0.037c 0.037c 0.063a





















UBO, foreign group 0.260a
(9.442)






Inverse Mills -0.286a -0.331a -0.302a -0.311a -0.304a -0.306a -0.311a
(-8.683) (-10.68) (-8.988) (-10.12) (-9.496) (-9.303) (-8.065)
Obs. 48,343 28,447 28,447 28,447 28,447 28,447 28,447 10,042
R2 0.164 0.0619 0.0632 0.0645 0.0661 0.0692 0.0699 0.0836
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering around the country and product identity in the
second stage. The standard error are clustered at ﬁrm level in the ﬁrst stage equation. t-statistics
in parentheses. a, b , c signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
24Table B.2: Outsourcing of intermediate inputs and the non-linear impact of complexity (marginal eﬀects presented).
Panel A: high level of complexity
IPR 0.053a 0.052a 0.05a 0.049a 0.069a 0.163a
(2.823) (2.72) (2.832) (2.87) (3.334) (3.658)
Product complexity -0.562b -0.502c -0.485c -0.56c -0.557b -0.822c
(-2.089) (-1.836) (-1.729) (-1.952) (-1.960) (-1.728)
Abs. Capacity 0.019a 0.019a 0.012 -0.002
(4.377) (4.273) (1.499) (-0.195)
TFP, lag 0.053a 0.053a 0.076a
(2.955) (2.944) (3.335)






Inverse mills -0.224a -0.273a -0.226a -0.234a -0.217a -0.219a -0.188a
(-4.473) (-5.741) (-4.505) (-4.896) (-4.543) (-4.518) (-3.523)
Obs. 14,246 14,246 14,246 14,246 14,246 14,246 5,055
R2 0.0751 0.0735 0.0757 0.0766 0.0816 0.0824 0.0972
Panel B: low level of complexity
IPR 0.023 0.023 0.021 0.025 0.039c 0.069b
(1.065) (1.067) (1.053) (1.147) (1.72) (2.332)
Product complexity -0.183 -0.220 -0.245 -0.257 -0.255 -0.526
(-0.729) (-0.878) (-0.970) (-1.003) (-1.019) (-1.259)
Abs. Capacity 0.027a 0.027a 0.018c -0.004
(3.979) (4.043) (1.813) (-0.231)
TFP, lag 0.029 0.029 0.056b
(1.115) (1.115) (2.304)






Inverse mills -0.339a -0.354a -0.341a -0.349a -0.346a -0.347a -0.374a
(-10.75) (-11.37) (-11.16) (-12.09) (-11.82) (-11.51) (-10.29)
Obs. 14,201 14,201 14,201 14,201 14,201 14,201 4,987
R2 0.0602 0.0579 0.0602 0.0624 0.0648 0.0654 0.0807
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering around the country and product identity in the
second stage. First stage regression as in Table B.1. t-statistics in parentheses. a, b , c signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
25Table B.3: Alternative measure of IPR (marginal eﬀects presented).
Average IPR (1995-2000)
Average IPR 0.084a 0.062a 0.089b
(5.833) (3.023) (2.096)
Product complexity 0.348a -0.435a -0.603a
(3.036) (-3.840) (-3.631)
Abs. capacity 0.000 0.012 0.003
(0.036) (1.528) (0.165)


















No. of French related parties 0.164a
(16.757)
UBO, foreign group 0.259a
(10.153)






Inverse mills -0.312a -0.321a
(-11.005) (-9.686)
Obs. 66,935 39,635 14,978
R2 0.166 0.058 0.0698
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering around the country and product identity in the
second stage. The standard error are clustered at ﬁrm level in the ﬁrst stage equation. t-statistics
in parentheses. a, b , c signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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